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Abstract
In strategic candidacy games, both voters and can-
didates have preferences over the set of candidates,
and candidates may strategically withdraw from the
election in order to manipulate the outcome accord-
ing to their preferences. In this work, we extend
the standard model of strategic candidacy games
by observing that candidates may find it costly to
run an electoral campaign and may therefore pre-
fer to withdraw if their presence has no effect on
the election outcome. We study the Nash equilib-
ria and outcomes of natural best-response dynam-
ics in the resulting class of games, both from a nor-
mative and from a computational perspective, and
compare them with the Nash equilibria of the stan-
dard model.
1 Introduction
In his paper “Independence of clones as a criterion for voting
rules” [1987] Nicolaus Tideman tells the following story:
When I was 12 years old I was nominated to be
treasurer of my class at school. A girl named
Michelle was also nominated. I relished the
prospect of being treasurer, so I made a quick calcu-
lation and nominated Michelle’s best friend, Char-
lotte. In the ensuing election I received 13 votes,
Michelle received 12, and Charlotte received 11, so
I became treasurer.
Tideman uses this story to motivate the concept of clones—
candidates that are so similar to each other that all voters rank
them consecutively—and considers the problem of designing
clone-proof voting rules. However, one can also look at this
story from a somewhat different perspective: It is plausible
that both Michelle and Charlotte preferred either of them be-
coming the treasurer to the outcome where both of them lost.
Thus, either girl could have decided to withdraw her candi-
dacy to obtain a more desirable election result.
Now, while a typical teenager may find it difficult to make
a calculated choice in such situations (Tideman’s younger self
being an obvious exception), candidates in high-stakes elec-
tions often have strong preferences over possible election out-
comes as well as strategic reasoning skills, and may there-
fore consider withdrawing from an election so as to change
its winner to one they prefer to the current one. The re-
sulting interaction among the candidates can be described
as a non-cooperative game, where players are the candi-
dates, each candidate can choose whether to participate or
not, the voters (who are typically not considered to be strate-
gic players—see, however, [Brill and Conitzer, 2015], where
the model is extended to strategic voters) choose among
the available candidates, and each player compares possi-
ble outcomes according to his ranking of the candidates.
Such games are known as strategic candidacy games; they
were introduced by Dutta, Le Breton and Jackson [2001;
2002], and have subsequently been studied by several other
authors [Ehlers and Weymark, 2003; Eraslan and McLennan,
2004; Rodriguez-Alvarez, 2006a; 2006b; Lang et al., 2013;
Polukarov et al., 2015].
In the model of Dutta et al., which was also adopted
in subsequent work on strategic candidacy games, it is as-
sumed that each player is indifferent between any two strat-
egy profiles that result in the same election outcome. How-
ever, in practice candidates often have to take into account
the monetary and reputational costs of running an electoral
campaign. In particular, it is often natural to assume that
candidates are “lazy”, i.e., they prefer not to participate in
the election if doing so has no impact on who becomes the
winner. This type of secondary preferences has been re-
cently considered in the context of analyzing the behavior of
strategic voters, i.e., voters were assumed to abstain when
they were not pivotal (see, e.g., [Desmedt and Elkind, 2010;
Elkind et al., 2014] and references therein). However, to the
best of our knowledge, strategic candidacy games with lazy
candidates have not been investigated in prior work.
The goal of this paper is to initiate the study of this class
of games. For simplicity, we focus on the case where the
voters make their choice among the available candidates us-
ing the Plurality rule. We consider Nash equilibria of such
games as well as analyze two natural best-response dynamics
for this setting: one where initially the set of active candi-
dates is empty and the candidates join one by one, and one
where initially all candidates are present, but then withdraw
one by one. We relate the properties of strategic candidacy
games with lazy candidates to those of “vanilla” strategic can-
didacy games, explore the role of Pareto dominance and Con-
dorcet winners in this setting, and prove a number of compu-
tational complexity results. In particular, we show that check-
ing whether a given strategic candidacy game with lazy can-
didates admits a Nash equilibrium is NP-complete.
2 Preliminaries and Model
We consider settings where there is a finite set of potential
candidates C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} and a finite set of voters
V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}; we assume C ∩ V = ∅. Given a set
A ⊆ C, let L(A) denote the set of all linear orders over A.
Each voter v ∈ V is associated with a preference order v∈
L(C); the list PV = (v)v∈V is referred to as the voters’
preference profile.
An election proceeds as follows. First, a subset of candi-
dates A ⊆ C announces that they will participate in the elec-
tion; we refer to the candidates in A as the actual candidates.
If A = ∅, a pre-determined candidate from C is declared to
be the election winner. Otherwise, each voter v ∈ V reports
her preferences over the candidates in A; these preferences
are obtained by restricting v to A. We assume that all vot-
ers report their preferences sincerely. A voting rule takes the
set A and the list of voters’ preferences over A as input, and
outputs a candidate w ∈ A; this candidate is called the elec-
tion winner. In this paper, we will only consider the Plurality
rule. Under this rule, the score sc(c) of a candidate c ∈ A
is equal to the number of voters who rank c first among the
candidates in A; the winner is the candidate with the highest
score, with ties broken according to a fixed priority order C
over C (i.e., if sc(a) = sc(b) > sc(c) for every c ∈ A\{a, b}
and a C b, then a is declared to be the election winner). For
consistency, we assume that, when A = ∅, the winner is the
top candidate in C; we denote this candidate by cC.
Candidacy games
Candidacy games are characterized by two important fea-
tures: (1) candidates themselves also have preferences over
the set C, and (2) each candidate can choose whether to run
in the election.
Formally, each candidate c ∈ C has two available actions:
1 (run) and 0 (abstain). Also, each candidate c ∈ C is en-
dowed with a preference order c over C; the list PC = (c
)c∈C is referred to as the candidates’ preference profile. We
say that a candidate c ∈ C has self-supporting preferences
if c c a for all a ∈ C \ {a}. While much of the work
on candidacy games assumes that all candidates have self-
supporting preferences, and, indeed, this assumption is rea-
sonable in many real-life scenarios, there are settings where
it is not satisfied. For example, a person may volunteer for
a leadership position because her colleagues expect her to do
so, but secretly hope not to be elected because of the associ-
ated workload. Therefore, instead of making this assumption
in our work, we explicitly indicate which of our results hold
for candidates with self-supporting preferences.
The tuple 〈C, V, PV , PC ,C〉 defines two related strate-
gic games: the vanilla strategic candidacy game (VSCG)
Γ = Γ(C, V, PV , PC ,C) and the lazy strategic candidacy
game (LSCG) ΓL = ΓL(C, V, PV , PC ,C). In both games,
the set of players is C and each player’s set of actions is
{0, 1}. We denote the action (strategy) of a player c ∈ C
by sc; the vector s = (sc)c∈C is called the strategy pro-
file. A strategy profile s defines the set of actual candidates
A(s) = {c ∈ C | sc = 1}. Consequently, each strategy
profile defines an outcome w(s) ∈ C: w(s) is simply the
outcome of Plurality voting by voters in V over candidates in
A(s) when A(s) is not empty (with ties broken according to
C), and w(s) = cC when A(s) = ∅. We denote by sc(c, s)
the Plurality score obtained by a candidate c ∈ A(s) when
voters in V vote over candidates in A(s). The only differ-
ence between Γ and ΓL is in the players’ preferences over the
states of the game: in Γ a player c prefers s to t (denoted
by s >c t) if and only if w(s) c w(t), whereas in ΓL a
player c prefers s to t (denoted by s >Lc t) if and only if
(i) w(s) c w(t) or (ii) w(s) = w(t), sc = 0 and tc = 1.
That is, in ΓL a candidate is willing to run if his presence can
change the election outcome for the better; however, if his
presence has no effect on the election outcome, he prefers not
to participate. These definitions extend to voting rules other
than Plurality in an obvious way.
We will be interested in Nash equilibria of VSCGs and
LSCGs. Recall that a strategy profile s is said to be a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium if no player in the game can prof-
itably deviate. Formally, given a VSCG Γ (respectively, an
LSCG ΓL) described by a 5-tuple 〈C, V, PC , PV ,C〉, we say
that a strategy profile s is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(PNE) of Γ (respectively, ΓL) if for every candidate c ∈ C
it is not the case that t >c s (respectively, t >Lc s), where
t is the strategy profile given by ta = sa for a ∈ C \ {c},
tc = 1− sc.
In what follows, we write v : abc (respectively, c : abc)
to indicate that the preference order of voter v (respectively,
candidate c) is a  b  c. When voters’ names are not
important, we omit them, and write, e.g., (abc, abc, bca) to
denote a profile where two voters rank the candidates as a 
b  c and one voter ranks the candidates as b  c  a.
Also, we will sometimes identify a state s with its set of actual
candidates A(s).
3 Nash Equilibria
We start our investigation of lazy strategic candidacy games
by exploring the properties of their PNE.
Properties of Nash Equilibria
In this section, we consider the role of common social choice
concepts, such as Pareto dominance and Condorcet winners,
in LSCGs. We will also compare these games to their vanilla
counterparts.
Pareto Dominance Consider an LSCG ΓL where candidate
a Pareto-dominates candidate b in PV , i.e., every voter in V
prefers a to b. One would expect that b cannot be the election
winner in a PNE of ΓL. However, this turns out to depend on
b’s preferences and the tie-breaking order C.
Proposition 1. Let ΓL = ΓL(C, V, PC , PV ,C). Suppose
that a v b for all v ∈ V . If (1) a a b and (2) aC b then for
every PNE s of ΓL we have b 6= w(s). However, if either of
the conditions (1) and (2) is not satisfied, b can be a winner
in a PNE of ΓL.
Proof. Suppose that conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, and
suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is a PNE s
with w(s) = b. Note that a C b implies b 6= cC, and hence
t = sc(b, s) > 0. Clearly, a 6∈ A(s): otherwise no voter
would rank b first. Consider the modified strategy profile s′
with s′a = 1, s
′
c = sc for c ∈ C \ {a}. We have sc(a, s′) ≥ t:
all voters who vote for b in s would switch to voting for a
in s′. On the other hand, since b = w(s), for every candidate
c ∈ C\{a, b}we have sc(c, s′) ≤ sc(c, s) ≤ t, and sc(c, s) =
t implies b C c. As a C b, this means that a = w(s′); since
a a b, switching from s to s′ is a profitable deviation for a.
It is easy to see that condition (1) is necessary: consider an
election with C = {a, b}, a single voter who prefers a to b,
and candidates’ preferences given by b a a, b b a. Clearly,
the resulting game has a PNE s with A(s) = {b}.
To see that condition (2) is necessary, let C = {a, b, c, d},
and suppose that b C c C a C d and voters’/candidates’ pref-
erences are given by
PV = (dcab, cdab, cdab, abcd, abcd),
PC = (a : abcd, b : bacd, c : cabd, d : dbac).
Then the strategy profile s with A(s) = {b, c, d} is a PNE,
even though all voters as well as candidate a prefer a to b.
Note that condition (1) is satisfied whenever all candidates
have self-supporting preferences. Furthermore, the reader can
check that Proposition 1 remains true for VSCGs.
Condorcet Winners An important notion in social choice
is that of a Condorcet winner: this is a candidate that beats
every other candidate in their pairwise election. Formally,
given a profile PV over a candidate set C and two candidates
a, b ∈ C, let nab denote the number of voters in V who prefer
a to b. A candidate c ∈ C is said to be a Condorcet winner in
(C,PV ) if nca > nac for all a ∈ C \ {c}.
This concept turns out to be relevant for our analysis: if
a candidate c is a Condorcet winner in (C,PV ), and c has
self-supporting preferences, then the strategy profile s with
A(s) = {c} is clearly a PNE of the respective game ΓL. In-
deed, if any other candidate decided to run, he would lose to
c anyway, and c has no reason to withdraw.
In fact, we can obtain a full characterization of PNE with
exactly one participating candidate, by modifying this con-
cept so as to take into account the candidates’ preferences
and the tie-breaking order. Specifically, given a priority or-
der C over C, we say that a candidate c ∈ C is a (PC ,C)-
Condorcet winner in (C,PV , PC) if for each a ∈ C \ {c}
we have (i) nca > nac or (ii) nca = nac and c C a or (iii)
c a a. Note that an election may have several (PC ,C)-
Condorcet winners; however, if the number of voters is odd
and all candidates have self-supporting preferences, a candi-
date is a (PC ,C)-Condorcet winner in (C,PV , PC) if and
only if she is a Condorcet winner in (C,PV ).
We are now ready to state our characterization result.
Proposition 2. Let ΓL = ΓL(C, V, PC , PV ,C). A strategy
profile s0 with A(s0) = ∅ is a PNE of ΓL if and only if we
have cC c c for all c ∈ C \ {cC}. Further, for a given
candidate c ∈ C the strategy profile sc with A(sc) = {c} is a
PNE of ΓL if and only if c is a (PC ,C)-Condorcet winner in
(C,PV , PC), c 6= cC, and c c cC.
Proof. We have w(s0) = cC. Thus, if every candidate
c ∈ C \ {cC} prefers cC to herself, she has no reason to
participate, and neither does cC. Conversely, if c c cC for
some c ∈ C \ {cC}, candidate c would prefer to join the
election and win.
Now, consider a candidate c and the strategy profile sc.
If c is a (PC ,C)-Condorcet winner, no candidate that can
change the election outcome by participating is willing to do
so. Moreover, if c 6= cC and c c cC, c prefers not to with-
draw. Thus, under these conditions sc is a PNE of ΓL. Con-
versely, if c = cC or cC c c, then c would prefer to with-
draw, and if c is not a (PC ,C)-Condorcet winner, there is a
candidate a who beats c in their pairwise election and prefers
herself to c; this candidate could then participate in the elec-
tion and win.
Interestingly, the analysis in Proposition 2 shows that if cC
is a (PC ,C)-Condorcet winner then there is no PNE where
cC is the unique candidate participating in the election; in
contrast, if any other candidate is a (PC ,C)-Condorcet win-
ner and has self-supporting preferences, there is a PNE where
this candidate is the unique participant. Elkind et al. [2014]
observe that a similar phenomenon arises in equilibria of Plu-
rality elections with lazy voters.
We remark that even if an instance (C,PV , PC) has a
(PC ,C)-Condorcet winner, it may have PNE where the
(PC ,C)-Condorcet winner does not participate.
Example 1. Let C = {a, b, c, d}, and suppose that a C b C
cC d and voters’/candidates’ preferences are given by
PV = (bacd, cadb, dacb),
PC = (a : abcd, b : bcda, c : cbda, d : dbca).
Candidate a is the unique (PC ,C)-Condorcet winner, yet
the strategy profile s with A(s) = {b, c, d} is a PNE.
Vanilla vs. Lazy Games It is not hard to verify that every
PNE of a lazy strategic candidacy game is also a PNE of the
respective vanilla strategic candidacy game.
Proposition 3. Consider a tuple 〈C, V, PC , PV ,C〉 and let
Γ = Γ(C, V, PC , PV ,C) and ΓL = ΓL(C, V, PC , PV ,C).
Then every PNE of ΓL is a PNE of Γ.
Proof. Consider a strategy profile s for 〈C, V, PC , PV ,C〉
and a candidate c ∈ C. Suppose that s is a PNE of ΓL with
winner w. If sc = 1, then, since s is a PNE of ΓL, setting
sc = 0 would change the election outcome from w to some
p with w c p; thus, in Γ player c would not want to change
his action to 0 either. On the other hand, if sc = 0, since s is
a PNE of ΓL, it has to be the case that setting sc = 1 either
does not change the election outcome at all, or changes it to
one that c likes less than w. Hence c cannot profitably deviate
in Γ either.
It is known that VSCGs under Plurality may have no
PNE [Lang et al., 2013]; Proposition 3 implies that this is
also the case for LSCGs.
The converse of Proposition 3 is not true: a strategy profile
that is a PNE of Γ may fail to be a PNE of ΓL. An example is
easy to construct: suppose, for instance, that C = {a, b}, all
voters prefer a to b, and the candidates have self-supporting
preferences. Then s = (1, 1) is a PNE of Γ, but in ΓL can-
didate b prefers to abstain. A somewhat more complicated
example shows that there are settings where Γ has a PNE, but
ΓL does not.
Example 2. Let C = {a, b, c}, and suppose that we have
PV = (abc, bca, cab), PC = (a : abc, b : bca, c : cab).
Suppose also that a C b C c. Then Γ(C, V, PV , PC ,C)
has a PNE s with A(s) = {a, b}, w(s) = a. However,
ΓL = ΓL(C, V, PV , PC ,C) has no PNE. To see this, ob-
serve first that LSCGs have no PNE with exactly two partic-
ipating candidates: indeed, the loser would prefer to with-
draw. Moreover, as GL has no (PC ,C)-Condorcet winner,
by Proposition 2 it has no PNE with one participating candi-
date, and since candidates’ preferences are self-supporting,
there is no PNE with zero participating candidates. It re-
mains to observe that (1, 1, 1) is not a PNE of GL either, as
candidate c would rather withdraw.
Complexity of PNE
Proposition 2 describes PNE where the number of participat-
ing candidates is zero or one. However, Example 1 illustrates
that there can be PNE with three participants, and it is easy
to extend the construction in that example to obtain PNE with
any number of participants. This indicates that it may be non-
trivial to identify all PNE of a given game, and provides moti-
vation for studying the complexity of computing PNE in lazy
strategic candidacy games.
To this end, we define the following decision problems:
• LAZYNE: Given a game ΓL = ΓL(C, V, PV , PC ,C)
and a strategy profile s, decide whether s is a PNE of ΓL.
• LAZY∃NE: Given a game ΓL = ΓL(C, V, PV , PC ,C)
decide whether ΓL has a PNE.
• LAZY∃WNE: Given a game ΓL =
ΓL(C, V, PV , PC ,C) and a candidate c ∈ C, de-
cide whether ΓL has a PNE s with w(s) = c.
It is easy to see that LAZYNE is in P: as each player only
has two available actions, we only need to consider n possible
deviations. In contrast, LAZY∃NE and LAZY∃WNE turn out
to be computationally hard.
Theorem 1. For lazy strategic candidacy games, the prob-
lems LAZY∃NE and LAZY∃WNE are NP-complete, even if
all candidates have self-supporting preferences.
Proof. Our observation that LAZYNE is polynomial-time
solvable immediately implies that these problems are in NP.
To show that these problems are NP-hard, we provide a
reduction from a restricted variant of the classic EXACT 3-
COVER (X3C) problem. An instance of this problem is given
by a set of ground elements U = {u1, . . . , u3r} and a family
Z = {Z1, . . . , Zt} of 3-element subsets ofU ; we assume that
Z` = {ui` , uj` , uk`} for some i`, j`, k` ∈ {1, . . . , 3r}. It is
a “yes”-instance if there exists a subfamily Ẑ ⊂ Z such that
∪Z∈ẐZ = U and Zi ∩Zj = ∅ for all Zi, Zj ∈ Ẑ with i 6= j;
otherwise it is a “no”-instance. We additionally assume that
r ≥ 2 and each element of U is contained in exactly three
distinct sets in Z; note that this implies that t = 3r. This
variant of X3C, which we will refer to as RX3C, has been
shown to be NP-complete by Gonzalez [1984].
Given an instance (U,Z) of RX3C with |U | = 3r, we set
q = 30r2 and construct an LSCG with the set of candidates
C = U∪Z∪{w0, w1, w2} and n = 18r+3r(q−1)+3q−3r
voters. The preference profiles PV and PC are specified in
Tables 1 and 2, respectively. In these tables we write Ui to
denote the order ui  ui+1  · · ·  u3r  u1  · · ·  ui−1
over U ; we write Ui \ U ′, where U ′ ⊂ U , to refer to the
order Ui with the candidates in U ′ removed. Also, we write
Z−i to refer to an arbitrary order over Z \ {Zi}; similarly,
we write U and Z to refer to arbitrary orders over U and
Z , respectively. Finally, we set w1 C U C Z C w2 C w0.
Note that the candidates’ preferences are self-supporting. Let
ΓL = ΓL(C, V, PV , PC ,C).
We will now argue that if we have started with a “yes”-
instance of RX3C then ΓL has a PNE with winner w1, and
if we have started with a “no”-instance of RX3C then ΓL has
no PNE. This establishes NP-hardness of both LAZY∃NE and
LAZY∃WNE.
Specifically, it can be checked that if a collection of subsets
Z ′ provides an exact cover of U then the strategy vector s
with A(s) = U ∪ {w0, w1, w2} ∪ (Z \ Z ′) is a PNE with
w(s) = w1.
For the converse direction we show that if ΓL has a PNE
s, then U ∪ {w0, w1, w2} ⊆ A(s) and w(s) = w1, and use
this to conclude that candidates in Z \A(s) provide an exact
cover of U .
In more detail, observe first that this profile does not admit
a (PC ,C)-Condorcet winner: indeed, the candidates’ prefer-
ences are self-supporting, for every candidate c ∈ C \ U at
least 3r(q − 1) > n/2 voters prefer any candidate in U to c,
and for every candidate ui ∈ C at least (3r−1)(q−1) > n/2
voters prefer ui−1 to ui (where we let u0 := u3r).
Now, suppose that ΓL had a PNE s. We will argue that
U ∪ {w0, w1, w2} ⊆ A(s) and w(s) = w1.
To show this, we will first prove thatA(s)∩U 6= ∅. Indeed,
if A(s) ∩ U = ∅, then if u1 were to enter the election, he
would receive 3r(q−1) > n/2 votes and win. As u1 has self-
supporting preferences, this is a contradiction with s being a
PNE of ΓL.
Moreover, we have U ⊆ A(s). Indeed, suppose that U \
A(s) 6= ∅. Then there exists a candidate ui ∈ U ∩ A(s) with
sc(ui, s) ≥ 2q−2. As A(s)∩U 6= ∅, the score of each candi-
date in Z ∪ {w0, w1, w2} does not exceed q + 18r < 2q− 2,
so the winner is some candidate uj ∈ U . Applying an in-
ductive argument to candidates uj−1, . . . , u1, u3r, . . . , uj+1
(where u0 := u3r and u3r+1 := u1), we conclude that each
of these candidates prefers not to participate in the election.
Thus, sc(uj , s) ≥ 3r(q − 1), and therefore all candidates
in Z ∪ {w0, w1, w2} prefer not to participate as well, so
A(s) = {uj}. But this is a contradiction with Proposition 2,
as uj is not a (PC ,C)-Condorcet winner. The contradiction
shows that U ⊆ A(s).
We can now conclude that {w0, w1, w2} ⊂ A(s): if this
was not the case, u1 would get at least 2q − 2r − 1 point and
Block 1 (3r votes) Block 2 (6r votes) Block 3 (9r votes)
Z1 Z2 . . . Z3r Z1 Z1 . . . Z3r Z3r . . . Z` Z` Z` . . .
w1 w1 . . . w1 w2 w2 . . . w2 w2 . . . ui` uj` uk` . . .
w2 w2 . . . w2 U1 U1 . . . U3r U3r . . . w2 w2 w2 . . .
U1 U2 . . . U3r Z−1 Z−1 . . . Z−3r Z−3r . . . Ui` \ {ui`} Uj` \ {uj`} Uk` \ {uk`} . . .
Z−1 Z−2 . . . Z−3r w0 w0 . . . w0 w0 . . . Z−` Z−` Z−` . . .
w0 w0 . . . w0 w1 w1 . . . w1 w1 . . . w0 w0 w0 . . .
. . . w1 w1 w1 . . .
Block 4 (3r(q − 1) + 3q − 3r votes)
u1 u2 . . . u3r w2 w1 w0
U1 \ {u1} U2 \ {u2} . . . U3r \ {u3r} U U U
Z Z . . . Z Z Z Z
w2 w2 . . . w2 w0 w2 w2
w0 w0 . . . w0 w1 w0 w1
w1 w1 . . . w1 ︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ (q−2r) copies (q−r) copies q copies
(q−1) copies (q−1) copies (q−1) copies
Table 1: Proof of Theorem 1: voters’ preferences
win, in which case u3r would prefer to withdraw. It follows
that w1 = w(s): otherwise a candidate ui ∈ U \ {w(s), u3r}
would prefer to withdraw, as this would make ui+1 the win-
ner, and ui prefers ui+1 to all candidates other than himself
and w1.
Now that we have established that w1 = w(s), we can
observe that exactly 2r candidates from Z participate in the
election: if |A(s) ∩ Z| = 2r + x for x > 0 then sc(w1, s) <
q = sc(w0, s), and if |A(s) ∩ Z| = 2r − x for x > 0 then
sc(w2, s) = q−2r+2(r+x) > q−r+(r+x) = sc(w1, s).
Let Ẑ = Z \ A(s). We have shown that |Ẑ| = r. We
will now argue that Ẑ provides an exact cover of U . Indeed,
suppose that this is not the case. As |Ẑ| = r, it follows that
there exists an element ui ∈ U that appears in two distinct
sets Zj , Zk ∈ Ẑ . But then we have sc(ui, s) ≥ q + 1 > q =
sc(w1, s), a contradiction with w1 = w(s).
It is natural to ask whether the hardness results established
in Theorem 1 still hold if the number of voters or the number
of candidates is small. It turns out that both LAZY∃NE and
LAZY∃WNE become easier under these constraints.
In more detail, it is immediate that both LAZY∃NE and
LAZY∃WNE admit an algorithm whose running time is
2mpoly(n,m), where n = |V | and m = |C|: we can simply
enumerate all strategy profiles, and, for each of them, check
whether it is a PNE and, in case of LAZY∃WNE, compute its
winner. In fact, this procedure works not just for Plurality,
but for any voting rule with a polynomial-time winner de-
termination procedure. To obtain an algorithm that performs
well when the number of voters n is small, we observe that
(1) in any PNE of a Plurality-based LSCG the number of can-
didates with a positive score does not exceed n, and (2) in any
Z`, ` = 1, . . . , 3r ui, i = 1, . . . , 3r w1 w2 w0
Z` ui w1 w2 w0
ui` w1 w2 w1 w1
uj` Ui \ {ui} U U U
uk` Z Z Z Z
w1 w2 w0 w0 w2
U` \ {ui` , uj` , uk`} w0
Z−`
w2
w0
Table 2: Proof of Theorem 1: candidates’ preferences
PNE s we have sc(c, s) > 0 for all c ∈ A(s). Therefore, it
suffices to consider strategy profiles s with |A(s)| ≤ n; the
number of such profiles does not exceed mn. The following
proposition summarizes these observations in the language of
fixed-parameter complexity (see, e.g., Niedermeier [2006]).
Proposition 4. The problems LAZY∃NE and LAZY∃WNE
are in FPT with respect to the number of candidates m and in
XP with respect to the number of voters n.
4 Best-response Dynamics
In practice, knowing that a game has a PNE does not nec-
essarily mean that players will reach a stable outcome, as it
may be difficult for computationally bounded players to find
it. Therefore, it is important to understand which states of the
game can be achieved by players that optimize their behavior
in an iterative fashion. To this end, we will now consider my-
opic dynamics of LSCGs, i.e., sequences of states where each
state is obtained from the previous one by allowing a single
player to deviate in a way that is beneficial for her.
It is natural to assume that once a candidate withdraws
from the election, he cannot rejoin it; indeed, this is typically
the case in real-life elections. Under this assumption, if all
candidates were present in the initial state, then at each sub-
sequent step one candidate withdraws from the election until
none of the remaining candidates has an incentive to do so;
we refer to this type of dynamics as W-dynamics. We will
also consider the complementary setting where initially the
set of candidates is empty, and the candidates join the election
one by one and are not allowed to leave; we refer to this type
of dynamics as J-dynamics. Under both types of dynamics
each candidate can change his action at most once, and there-
fore any such dynamic process converges in at most m steps,
where m is the number of candidates. Note, however, that the
final state need not be a PNE: e.g., under W-dynamics it may
be the case that a candidate who has withdrawn at an earlier
point would prefer to rejoin, but is prevented from doing so
by the “no rejoining” rule. Thus, the set of states reachable
by such dynamics can be seen as a distinct solution concept
for LSCGs.
We will now discuss some properties of the W-dynamics
and J-dynamics. For simplicity, we assume that the num-
ber of voters is odd and the candidates’ preferences are self-
supporting (and hence a candidate is a (PC ,C)-Condorcet
winner if and only if she is a Condorcet winner); however,
our results extend to the general case.
Consider a game ΓL = ΓL(C, V, PC , PV ,C). We have
argued that if (C,PV ) has a Condorcet winner c 6= cC then
ΓL has a PNE s with A(s) = {c}. We will now investigate
whether such a PNE can be achieved by W-dynamics or J-
dynamics.
Proposition 5. Let ΓL = ΓL(C, V, PC , PV ,C), and sup-
pose that c 6= cC in a Condorcet winner in (C,PV ). Then
there is a J-dynamics that leads to the state s with A(s) =
{c}. However, there may be no W-dynamics that terminates
in a state s′ with c ∈ A(s′), and there may exist a J-dynamics
that terminates in a state s′′ with c 6∈ A(s′′).
Proof. The J-dynamics where agent c joins at the first step
terminates as soon as c joins, since the resulting state is a
PNE. For W-dynamics, consider the profile in Example 1:
here the Condorcet winner a is the only candidate that has an
incentive to leave from the original state (1, 1, 1, 1), so he is
not present in any terminal state of the W-dynamics. Further,
the reader can verify that ∅ → {d} → {c, d} → {b, c, d} is a
J-dynamics for this profile that results in a stable state where
a does not participate.
It is also interesting to ask whether our dynamics can ter-
minate in the state where all candidates are present. Clearly,
for W-dynamics this is only possible if this state is a PNE.
In contrast, the following example shows that J-dynamics can
reach this state even if it is not a PNE.
Example 3. Let C = {a, b, c, d}, and suppose that a C b C
cC d and voters’/candidates’ preferences are given by
PV = (abcd, bcda, cdab, dabc),
PC = (a : abcd, b : bcda, c : cdab, d : dabc).
Observe that {d} → {c, d} → {b, c, d} → {a, b, c, d} is a
J-dynamics for this profile, and its final state is not a PNE.
Proposition 5 and Example 3 further illustrate that the set
of terminal states of W- and J-dynamics may differ from the
set of PNE of a given LSCG.
Finally, we can show that deciding whether either of our
dynamics can terminate in a state with a given winner/set of
actual candidates is NP-hard; the proof is obtained by modi-
fying the construction in the proof of Theorem 1 and is omit-
ted due to space constraints.
Theorem 2. Given an LSCG game ΓL, a candidate c and a
state s of ΓL, the following problems are NP-complete:
• deciding whether J-dynamics may converge to s;
• deciding whether W-dynamics may converge to s;
• deciding whether J-dynamics may converge to a state s′
with w(s′) = c;
• deciding whether W-dynamics may converge to a state
s′ with w(s′) = c.
5 Related Work and Discussion
Early work on strategic candidacy games [Dutta et al., 2001;
2002; Ehlers and Weymark, 2003; Eraslan and McLennan,
2004; Rodriguez-Alvarez, 2006b; 2006a] focused on voting
rules other than Plurality. Vanilla strategic candidate games
under Plurality are briefly considered by Lang et al. [2013]
and then in more detail by Polukarov et al. [2015]. In partic-
ular, Lang et al. argue that any VSCG with three candidates
and self-supporting preferences has a PNE, and provide an
example of a Plurality-based VSCG with four candidates and
no PNE. The first of these results stands in contrast with Ex-
ample 2, where we construct a three-candidate LSCG with
no PNE. Polukarov et al. primarily focus on dynamics of
VSCGs. However, their model is different from the one con-
sidered in Section 4, in that they allow candidates to rejoin an
election after having withdrawn. Their results imply that the
problems of checking whether a given VSCG has a PNE, or,
more narrowly, a PNE with a specific winner (i.e., the vanilla
analogues of LAZY∃NE and LAZY∃WNE) are NP-complete.
These results together with the analysis in our paper indi-
cate that VSCGs and LSCGs are broadly similar: in both,
Condorcet winners can win in PNE under mild additional
assumptions, and computational problems related to PNE of
both types of games are NP-hard. However, Example 2 points
to a crucial difference: laziness may destroy stability. In-
tuitively, the impact of laziness can be quite substantial, as
illustrated by the following simple probabilistic argument.
Consider a strategic candidacy game with C = {a, b, c}
and PC = (a : abc, b : bca, c : cab). We will argue that if
voters’ preferences are drawn uniformly at random, then with
probability at least 1/2 the profile s = (1, 1, 1) is a PNE of
the respective VSCG; however, it is not a PNE of the respec-
tive LSCG. Indeed, assume without loss of generality that
w(s) = a. Then a and c cannot benefit from withdrawing,
and b only wants to withdraw if the number of bca-voters is
larger that the number of bac-voters. As voters who rank b
first are equally likely to be bac-voters or bca-voters, the first
claim follows. For the second claim, note that b prefers to
withdraw from s.
Extending the analysis in the example above to estimate the
frequency of profiles that admit PNE (or, more narrowly, have
s = (1, . . . , 1) as PNE), both for vanilla and for lazy strategic
candidacy games, is an interesting direction for future work;
however, Theorem 1 and the hardness results of Polukarov et
al. indicate that this may be a difficult problem.
In this context, it may be interesting to note that, in con-
trast, Plurality voting games with lazy voters and lexico-
graphic tie-breaking are known to have a very simple struc-
ture: in PNE of such games at most one voter casts his vote,
and all other voters abstain. On the other hand, when vot-
ers are not lazy, there are PNE with many voters [Elkind et
al., 2014]. Thus, the similarity between VSCGs and LSCGs
should not be taken for granted.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have introduced strategic candidacy games with lazy can-
didates and analyzed the properties of their PNE. In contrast
with much of the previous work, we explicitly examined the
role of the assumption that candidates’ preferences are self-
supporting, as well as the impact of the tie-breaking order: for
instance, Proposition 1 indicates that we need to take these
into account when asking whether Pareto-dominated candi-
dates can appear in PNE of LSCGs.
As argued in Section 5, it would be interesting to obtain
quantitative results regarding frequency of profiles with PNE
in LSCGs and VSCGs; in particular, it is important to know
whether the profile s with A(s) = C is considerably less
likely to be stable in LSCGs compared to VSCGs.
Further, our model implicitly assumes that for each can-
didate the campaign costs are small: a candidate is willing to
participate even if all that it accomplishes is changing the out-
come from his 8th most preferred candidate to his 7th most
preferred candidate. Alternatively, we could explicitly model
both participation costs and utilities from each outcome, and
allow for the possibility that some of the changes in the elec-
tion outcomes are not significant enough to justify participa-
tion. While this model is richer than the one we have con-
sidered, for large enough costs, the associated computational
problems may become simpler, as in all but a handful of situ-
ations most of the candidates would prefer to withdraw.
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